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SNAPSHOT 
THE ROLE OF THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES IN THE 
TRANSATLANTIC FUTURE1 
Dániel BARTHA — Péter RADA 
A B S T R A C T  
The European continent has not witnessed large scale violence, since 
the Balkan Wars. The threat perceptions changed accordingly in 
Europe. Most European allies believe that even the current crises with 
Moscow doesn’t change the overall European security environment, but 
it proves, that Europe still needs the United States in maintaining 
security but also needs to substitute American resources in places 
which are important to the United States but may be abandoned in the 
future. Thus, Europe can prove that the Transatlantic Alliance is still 
important. The article assesses the consequences of the changing 
American foreign policy focus for the Visegrád countries. The article 
itself does not intend to give a full and comprehensive picture on all the 
possible scenarios for a joint Visegrád foreign policy initiative which 
would substitute effectively the waning American presence in Europe 
but it aims at highlighting the general strategic picture in Central and 
Eastern Europe and to provide an example for a joint effort.  
                                                                                                                                   
1 This article is the shortened and amended version of the Peter Rada’s article from the Panorma 2013. Due 
to the recent European events many arguments of the original article are outdated. To see the original 
article: RADA, Peter, 2013. Pivot to Asia and the Role of the Visegrád Countries in the Transatlantic Future 
after 2014. In: ONDREJCSÁK, Robert et al (eds.), 2013. Panorama of Global Security Environment 2013. 
Bratislava, CENAA, pp. 121–136 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
Recently, the American foreign policy became overstretched and the 
burden-sharing questions became relevant again. (Magyarics, 2010) The 
rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific is rather an organic orientation back to 
a “normal” American global presence as the United States has always been 
both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. (Ondrejcsák, 2012, 25) The American 
foreign policy ambitions are limited by the financial crisis and the necessary 
budget cuts. Thus, it was necessary to give a new shape to the foreign policy 
and deliberate a changed focus. The false sentiment that the United States 
paid the most attention to Europe during the last decades was fed by the 
active American engagement in the transitions of Central and Eastern 
Europe, the NATO enlargement and the active participation in settling the 
Balkan Wars. (Haas, 2011) Before the Ukrainian crisis, the predictable 
developments in Europe gave more confidence to the American decision 
makers to place more responsibility on the European allies. Washington 
also had to put some pressure on its allies, to match or at least credibly 
support American defense commitments and capabilities within NATO. 
Unfortunately the US withdrawal, with the misinterpretation of the 
security challenges was rather used by politicians as an argument for 
further downsize armies and military budgets. In parallel NATO’s smart 
defense and Europe’s pooling and sharing program couldn’t create credible 
capabilities. There were warnings signs, such as the operation in Libya, 
that US support will be needed to European allies to conduct any bigger 
mission or operation, even on fields where Europeans have the strongest 
capabilities on paper (such as air force). It is clearly seen now that the 
United States needs to keep some troops in Europe to avoid further 
encouraging Russia to become even more animated towards Europe aiming 
at filling any real or perceived power vacuum in Eastern Europe in face of 
low resistance, which means Europe failed to create a credible power even 
for territorial defense. 
The impression that Washington gave up Europe is false and is not in line 
with the real intentions of the Obama administration. (Ditrych, 2012, 52) 
The many ties between Europe and the United States continue to keep 
Europe as one of the central pillars of the American foreign policy. It is a 
false conclusion to consider Europe as a finished business. The European 
geopolitical order is more fragile than it is assumed in general. The fragility 
is fed by the ambiguity of the strategic future. The problem is even 
deepened by the fact that beyond the strategic foresight, also the common 
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threat perception is missing. This was clearly echoed in the first reactions 
on the Ukrainian crises by the European Allies. The fragmentation can be 
also seen among the lines of regional interests and ambitions. Without 
providing and supporting the possibility to likeminded countries to conduct 
defense planning, development and create strategies in smaller circles and 
clusters, the United States will find itself in a similar situation like now, 
when it has to return to the continent to create a realistic deterrence 
capability. Unfortunately, the fragmentation appeared among the V4 
countries as well, and without further developments or at least stronger 
political ambitions towards the support of Eastern Partnership countries 
by the smaller Visegrad countries, this will challenge the Visegrad defense 
cooperation. 
Even though, it is clear that the United States will not abandon Europe it 
is less predictable how Europe can fit in the new American global strategy. 
Obama’s pledge of 1 billion USD to reassure European allies suggests a 
short-term US answer to the current question, as the money can fund the 
presence of only non-permanent structures by the end of 2015 (Chivvis, 
2014). The commitment of US, most likely will strengthen the demand of 
raising military budgets as well. While Poland already announced a raise, 
Slovakia’s Prime Minister at GLOBSEC 2014 excluded this possibility, while 
significant Czech and Hungarian leadership remained silent on this 
question. Meanwhile, the modernization of the weapon systems to replace 
Soviet systems is further delayed, which can end up in loosening strategic 
cultures and through that further eroded credibility of these countries. This 
problem may test the transatlantic bond with the Visegrad countries 
already at the Wales Summit. 
The Lisbon Treaty provided at least institutional legitimacy for the more 
integrated development of the European foreign policy. However, the 
institutional decision making process is still too bureaucratic and complex 
through the overlapping domains of the Commission and the 
intergovernmental process of the Council. Furthermore, the foreign policy 
goals of the EU represent rather a wish list. (Bressand, 2011) Beyond that 
heavy burden, we need to take the note that the relation between the two 
sides of the Atlantic has always had multiple dimensions and the defense 
cooperation has meant only one of those. The real untearable bond is the 
trade and the foreign direct investments. The United States and Europe 
are mutually dependent on each other due to the enormous volume of these. 
Consequently, it is a clear mutual imperative to maintain security and 
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stability in the Atlantic region. (Techau, 2011) The economic anchor is 
strong and keeps the United States as a European power, even if physical 
military presence decreases. Nevertheless, fine-tuning the emphasis on 
mutual interests is as important as ever both for the United States and 
Europe. 
T H E  O P T I O N S  F O R  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E  A N D  T H E  
V I S E G R Á D  C O U N T R I E S  
The international security environment has changed significantly and the 
American relative power and global leadership has been challenged by new 
emerging competitors. On the global level, China is perhaps the most 
important factor of this change and even Russia seems to be less important 
from Washington. Due to the same reason, Russia has become more active 
in its near abroad on the periphery of Washington’s European allies. This 
Russian policy was extended into new and more sensitive territories of 
Europe by the current operations in Ukraine. To that happen numerous 
facts had to co-exist. The power vacuum of Ukraine and the perceived 
danger, that the Eastern Partnership program of the European Union will 
be successful in bonding some of the countries such as Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine on a longer term to Brussels, the relative weakness and 
political crises of the EU, as the consequence of the economic crises and the 
vacuum created by the withdrawal of US forces from Europe, was a unique 
reality and possibility for Moscow. This unique nature suggests that the 
crises with Russian can only temporary effect global security trends. 
Even though, the sources of Atlanticism are deep in Central and Eastern 
Europe and stem from historical experiences: the United States was the 
power which toppled communism, facilitated integration and later balanced 
the other European powers. (Asmus et al, 2005, 203) Central and Eastern 
European countries may be the best allies of the United States within the 
NATO but today they are definitely not the most important ones. Thus, 
Central and Eastern Europeans should also reconsider their strategic 
assessments on security issues because comfortable institutional answers 
may be not ready in the future. (Mitchell et al, 2013) The United States has 
long functioned as security anchor also in the European neighborhood. As 
such, the United States cannot leave the region completely in a fortnight 
and coordinated strategic efforts (such as the Visegrád cooperation, see 
Balogh, 2012) may keep the United States further interested in providing 
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enabling support in protecting the European neighborhood to become a 
space for new geopolitical contest. 
Today, the real interest of the Central Europeans and as such of the 
Visegrád countries2 is the growing coherence, better functioning and clear 
division between the NATO and the EU. The slowed down integration process 
of the NATO and the EU is partly due to the decreasing trust between West 
and the East part of Europe. Being in the middle, the Visegrád countries 
are more sensible to any developments in this regard. Consequently, it is 
not surprising that the Central Europeans are still more cooperative than 
competitive with the United States. However, the support is not unlimited. 
Thus, having no global aspirations, the Visegrád countries, which are many 
times seen as troublemakers by the Western European EU members, need 
to prove that they are important partners. (Samson, 2011) 
The Visegrád countries have been reliable contributors in many NATO led 
missions, most importantly in Afghanistan. In some regards, the Visegrád 
countries even performed beyond expectations and sent more troops 
relative to the size of their economies than many older allies. Thus, they 
were relevant partners for the United States. This condition will definitely 
change after 2014 even though all of the Visegrád countries already 
expressed their commitments to stay in Afghanistan in a different mission. 
(Nagy et al, 2013) Consequently, the fulfillment of the basic obligations 
within the NATO will be more important than ever. The defense spending is 
one of these crucial points. Obviously, there is a lot to do in this regard 
because except Poland the other three Visegrád countries are far from the 
informally agreed 2 per cent per GDP ratio. Despite the valued and strong 
defense cooperation between the United States and the Visegrád countries 
(Balogh, 2012) this fact always provides source for criticism even though 
many Western Europeans underachieve in this regard, too. On the other 
hand, because of the much stronger gravitational pull of the EU the label 
“best allies” is not as rewarding anymore for the Central Europeans. The 
Central European countries need to show that they understand today’s 
strategic international reality and the quid pro quo principles in order to 
maintain at least the American enabling protection or support. The 
Visegrád countries can, however, prove their willingness to participate in a 
                                                                                                                                   
2 The article uses the labels Central and Eastern Europe and the Visegrád countries as some kind of 
synonyms. It is obviously an oversimplification but in terms of coordinated strategic decisions in foreign 
policy the Visegrád Cooperation and the Visegrád+ formats represent Central and Eastern Europe. (See 
similar argument in Ruzicka, 2012) 
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mutually beneficial global division of labor if they take a constructive role 
in managing and solving problems that are also defined as such by 
Washington but where the United States reasonably expects more of a 
readiness to act on the part of Europe. (Marton et al, 2013) 
The actual homework for Europe and also for the Central Europeans is to 
figure out how to fill any real or perceived vacuum in the wake of smaller 
American presence. Europe needs to prove it has a strategic vision 
regarding these developments. As such, smaller regional blocks, as the 
Visegrád Cooperation3 can take certain responsibilities with particular 
regard to the Western Balkans (Huszka, 2010) or to the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership countries4. In line with the mutually shared American and 
European interests, the already significant Visegrád involvement in these 
regions means a real added value to the strategic retrenchment on the part 
of the United States and it sends signal to the EU that the Visegrád 
countries are willing to take an active role on resolving the strategic 
rebalance within the North Atlantic Alliance. The NATO necessarily has a 
role in these regions, too, and the organization must remain active (e.g. 
further expansion by letting new members in) even if the United States 
cannot afford the same efforts in Europe. In principle, it means more 
responsibility and more reliance on the European component of the NATO. 
C O N C L U S I O N S  
The ties between the United States and Europe will definitely keep 
Washington’s eye on Europe. The geopolitical situation shows that Europe 
is far from a finished business and but Europe needs to invest significantly 
more at least in maintaining its own security in order to sustain the 
relevance of the North Atlantic Alliance. 
The NATO still has important role in providing security in Europe and in 
representing a global security forum. Thus, the members need to put joint 
effort in maintaining the strong alliance. 
                                                                                                                                   
3 Associating the Visegrád countries with defense cooperation is rather new phenomenon and the group 
may provide a functioning platform or model on how to maintain NATO capabilities in a fiscally constrained 
environment. (Kron, 2010). The planned set up of the Visegrád EU Battle Group by 2016 is an example 
for both NATO’s smart defense and the EU’s pooling and sharing efforts. (Suplata, 2013) 
4 The EU’s Eastern Partnership platform is important region for the V4 even though this article, mostly due 
to the page limits, argues for the growing importance of the Western Balkans. 
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Even though the pivot to Asia is not intentionally a pivot away from Europe 
it is rather a sobering recognition that in today’s world any policy 
reorientation inevitable leads to changes in all the existing relations. The 
pivot means obviously significantly less American attention to Central and 
Eastern Europe, even though crises situations can change that for shorter 
periods. There will be serious criticism towards those members of the NATO 
which are not able to contribute more significantly to the mutual burdens 
in terms of for instance defence spending. 
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